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A real-estate developer seeks expedited environmental review of a
proposed real estate project. When the matter comes before the local government, a local official opposes the developer’s request for
expedited review. At the time this matter is pending, the official’s
spouse is seeking payment for work she had performed for the developer’s overseas affiliate on an unrelated matter.1

INTRODUCTION
Every day, all across the country, local and state governmental entities face a myriad of ethical issues and decisions. These entities set
up rules and regulations, and the elected officials in these jurisdictions
are accountable to their voters for establishing and maintaining ethical rules and standards. In the news story outlined above, one such
official may have overstepped ethical bounds and, if so, violated a
state ethics rule that subjects the official to a $5000 regulatory fine.
But, if the official used the United States mail in connection with this
matter, proposed legislation before Congress would render that official guilty of a federal offense and subject to a possible twenty years
in federal prison.2 If we multiply this story by many thousands, then

1. See Garrett Therolf, Supervisor’s Wife Was Owed $200,000 by an AEG Affiliate When He Voted on a Measure About Stadium Plans, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011,
at A4.
2. The Clean Up Government Act of 2011,” H.R. 2572, 111th Cong. (2011). The
relevant text is contained in the Appendix. See infra pp. 339–41. An earlier version
was introduced as the “Honest Services Restoration Act,” S. 3854, 111th Cong.
(2010). As this Article goes to press, competing versions of this bill are still pending
before Congress. The Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401,
112th Cong. (2011), was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 28,
2011. 157 CONG. REC. S5017 (daily ed. July 28, 2011) (reports of committees). The
Clean Up Government Act of 2011, H.R. 2572 (2011) was reported out of the House
Judiciary Committee on December 1, 2011. 157 CONG. REC. D1303 (daily ed. Dec. 1,
2011) (miscellaneous measures). In addition, there is a third bill, Restore Public
Trust Act, H.R. 4054, 112th Cong. (2012), introduced after unsuccessful attempts
were made to pass the text of S. 401 and H.R. 2572 in other bills. These other bills
include the STOCK Act, which prohibits insider trading by members of Congress.
The honest services language was ultimately omitted from that bill. See Press Release, Congresswoman Louise M. Slaughter, After Six Years, Slaughter’s Work to
End Insider Trading in Congress Will Become Law (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.louise.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2689:
after-six-years-slaughters-work-to-end-insider-trading-in-congress-will-becomelaw&catid=101:2012-press-releases&Itemid=55 (stating that public corruption prosecution improvements were left out of the STOCK Act). See Slaughter Claims
STOCK Victory, NIAGARA GAZETTE, Mar. 23, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR
6214369 (stating that public corruption prosecution improvements were left out of
the STOCK Act).

STRADER_CHRISTENSEN

2011]

5/10/2012 12:44 PM

SKILLING RECONSIDERED

311

we may start to feel that there is something seriously wrong with this
picture.
The underlying disease is the United States Congress’s attempt,
over the last forty years, to expand federal power to prosecute an ever-broader array of crimes.3 In a case arising out of the notorious Enron financial fraud scandal, the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Skilling at last confronted one of the most egregious
such crimes—federal “honest services” fraud.4 In its decision, the
Court narrowed the statute’s reach in order to avoid holding the statute unconstitutionally vague.5
With its decision partially striking down the federal honest services
fraud statute in the criminal case against former Enron CEO Jeffrey
Skilling, the United States Supreme Court took a modest step to
combat the trend towards the proliferation of overly-broad federal
criminal statutes. Such laws are often passed—or existing laws expanded by prosecutors—in the midst of financial or political scandal,
when the government needs to appear to be “doing something.”6 The
government faces pressure to produce criminal charges whenever
there is a perceived scandal or crisis, whether it is the recent financial
sector melt-down or the Enron-era financial scandals. Many of these
laws are passed quickly and with little thought or deliberation, producing the synergistic crises of overcriminalization7 and
overfederalization.8
3. See J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment—Reflections on
Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 48–49 & nn.17–21
(2007) [hereinafter Strader, White Collar Crime].
4. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). Although recently decided, the Skilling decision has
already generated a substantial amount of commentary. For commentary written before the decision was issued, see Nancy J. King, Introduction: Skilling v. United
States, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1 (2010); Julie R. O’Sullivan, Honest-Services

Fraud: A (Vague) Threat to Millions of Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable)
American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 23 (2010). For more recent commentary, see Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 31 (2010); Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption,
89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1823 (2011).
5. The Court’s opinion does not expressly state that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, only that the statute might be interpreted as such without the limitation imposed by the Court. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933.
6. See Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 3, at 52 (“[T]he explosions of
creative, aggressive white collar prosecutions tend to come in cycles. Not surprisingly, these waves tend to coincide with political pressure on the government to address
areas of public concern.”).
7. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005) [hereinafter Beale, Many Faces]. For one recent example of overcriminalization, see Orin
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This trend has the potential to affect the criminal justice system in
basic ways. Most fundamentally, under the U.S. Constitution’s Due
Process Clause,9 we all have a right to know what conduct is criminal
and what conduct is not. But the rush to criminalization has produced laws that no one—not even members of the U.S. Supreme
Court—can understand. As Justice Scalia famously noted about the
federal racketeering (RICO) statute, the definition of one of the
crime’s key elements is about as clear as “life is a fountain.”10 Such
statutes provide prosecutors with largely unfettered discretion in
bringing cases based upon novel, untested theories.11 And to the extent that Congress has played the overcriminalization game, we have
had a dramatic intrusion of federal law enforcement authority into
areas usually reserved for state and local prosecutors.12
Where have the courts been during this overcriminalization crisis?
Strangely absent. Courts have been hesitant to interfere with the legislative process by overturning criminal statutes. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has rarely invalidated criminal laws on the grounds that
the laws are vague and incomprehensible.
Once again, in the Skilling case, the Court declined to find the
criminal statute unconstitutionally vague.13 Instead, the six member
majority simply decided to rewrite the statute so that it only applies to
bribery and kickbacks—even though those words appear nowhere in
the statute.14 In reaching this result, the Court opened itself to criticism from both sides. For some, including Justice Scalia in concurrence,15 the Court had exceeded its power by rewriting the honest
services statute and thereby acting as a sort of super-legislative body.
S. Kerr, Should Faking a Name on Facebook Be a Felony?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2011, at A15.
8. See, e.g., Beale, Many Faces, supra note 7, at 768.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 653
(2011). Because of the prevalence of plea bargaining, many of these novel theories
are never tested in court. Id. at 649.
12. Many have commented on the overcriminalization phenomenon. See, e.g.,
Beale, Many Faces, supra note 7, at 748.
13. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 (2010).
14. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931.
15. In a concurring opinion joined by two other members of the Court, Justice
Scalia said that the Court should simply have invalidated a law that is so vague that it
cannot be understood. The concurring justices would have found the statute invalid
and left it to Congress to remedy the problem. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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Under this view, the Court should have voided the statute in its entirety. For others, the Court had overstepped its bounds by taking a
powerful anti-corruption tool away from prosecutors.16 Under this
view, the Court should have upheld the statute without modification.
This Article provides a soft defense of the Skilling decision, and a
critique of Congress’s proposed response to the decision.17 The Article argues that the honest services statute indeed created a vague
crime that failed to provide fair notice to potential defendants or to
cabin prosecutors’ discretion.18 But, in light of Congress’s complicity
in creating the overcriminalization and overfederalization crises, the
Court probably took the best (or least bad) route in attempting to
provide rational boundaries for honest services prosecutions.19
Part I of this Article traces the background of honest services
fraud.20 Part II examines the disparate responses to and criticisms of
the Skilling decision.21 Part III analyzes the Court’s options in Skilling, concluding that the judicial-legislative dynamic, in an environment rife with overcriminalization and overfederalization, inevitably
requires courts to attempt to provide some rational limits on our ever-expanding federal criminal laws.22 Part IV provides a preliminary
analysis of the proposed Congressional response to Skilling, a statute
that fails to solve the fundamental ambiguities inherent in “honest
services” fraud and that creates more problems than it solves.23
I. THE EVOLUTION OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
Beginning in the 1970s, federal prosecutors increasingly employed
the honest services theory to pursue corrupt politicians on the
grounds that those politicians had used the U.S. mails or interstate
wires to deprive their constituents of “honest services.”24 Among
those convicted were state governors and many others.25 The theory

16. See Griffin, supra note 4, at 1823.
17. See infra Parts III–IV.
18. See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 142–58 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 25–60 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 61–141 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 142–59 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 160–82 and accompanying text.
24. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 63–64 (3d
ed. 2011) [hereinafter STRADER, UNDERSTANDING].
25. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1352 (4th Cir. 1979), aff’d on
reh’g, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
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was also used against private employees who deprived their employers of “honest services.”26
A. Prosecutorial Invention of Honest Services Fraud
Federal prosecutors, the courts, and Congress have all contributed
to the evolution of the honest services quagmire. It all started in federal prosecutors’ offices. In traditional mail or wire fraud cases, the
government alleges that the defendant schemed to deprive the victim
of money or property.27 About forty years ago, however, another
theory came to be widely applied in mail and wire fraud cases—
honest services fraud. Initially, this theory was a prosecutoriallycreated and judicially-approved form of fraud that was not grounded
in the language or history of the underlying statutes. The predecessor
to the current mail fraud statute was adopted in 1872, and the wire
fraud statute in 1952.28
In the 1970s, prosecutors began to charge an array of crimes based
on the theory that the defendants’ schemes were designed to deprive
the victims of the intangible right to honest services.29 Public officials
and private persons were charged with honest services mail or wire
fraud based upon alleged deprivations owed, typically, to public citizens and private employers, respectively.30 In the highest profile cases, the government employed the theory to prosecute state and local
officials who had allegedly deprived their constituents of the officials’
duty to provide the public with honest services.31
B.

The McNally Decision

Federal courts consistently upheld this new mail and wire fraud
theory.32 Not surprisingly, the honest services theory produced case
law that was both inconsistent and difficult to comprehend. In
McNally v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned the law in
all the circuits that had considered the issue and ruled that the honest
26. See, e.g., United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 1973).
27. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 78–88.
28. See Nicholas J. Wagoner, Honest-Services Fraud: The Supreme Court Defuses the Government’s Weapon of Mass Discretion in Skilling v. United States, 51 S.
TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1092–96 (2010).
29. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 85–88.
30. See Wagoner, supra note 28, at 1096.
31. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 78–79; Wagoner, supra
note 28, at 1096–97.
32. See, e.g., Jason T. Elder, Federal Mail Fraud Unlearned: Revisiting the Criminal Catch-All, 77 OR. L. REV. 707, 714 n.33 (1998).
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services fraud theory is invalid.33 Instead, the Court held, a mail or
wire fraud case must be based upon proof that the defendant intended to deprive the victim of money or property.34 In McNally, a Kentucky state official participated in a kickback scheme involving state
insurance providers.35 The case was brought solely on the theory that
the state and its citizens lost their right to the public officials’ honest
services; the government did not allege or prove that the scheme was
designed to deprive the victims of money or property.36
The Supreme Court rejected the honest services theory on two
grounds. Initially, the Court focused on the language of the statutes,
which criminalize “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses . . . .”37
The Court rejected the argument that the “money or property” requirement only applies to the false or fraudulent pretenses prong of
the statute.38 The Court further found that Congress intended to incorporate the common law of fraud, which requires a scheme to deprive a victim or money or property.39
C.

The Honest Services Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346

Congress responded quickly to McNally.40 The year after the
McNally decision, Congress passed a law, codified at § 1346, simply
providing that “[f]or purposes of this Chapter, the term ‘scheme or
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of
the intangible right of honest services.”41 That is the entirety of the
statute. This law was simply tacked on to an unrelated bill without
33. 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987). For a recent, highly publicized case, see United
States v. Blagojevich, 594 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
34. McNally, 483 U.S. at 358–59.
35. Id. at 352–53.
36. Id. at 352.
37. Id. at 352 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1948)).
38. Id. at 356–58. The Court in McNally based its conclusion on the legislative
history. The Court found that the false pretenses language was added to make clear
that the mail fraud statute should reach future frauds, as the Court had held in
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).
39. Id. at 359 n.8.
40. One member of Congress stated that the law “restores the mail [and wire]
fraud provision[s] to where [they were] before the McNally decision.” 134 CONG.
REC. H11, 108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (alteration to
the original in the quoted text). However, even after § 1346 was enacted, McNally
continued to operate to limit prosecutions involving intangible property interests. See
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 20 (2000) (holding that fraudulent schemes
to obtain licenses and permits do not fall within the mail and wire fraud statutes).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994).
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any meaningful legislative history.42 Congress passed the statute as
part of a narcotics bill, and the honest services statute was never discussed or debated.43 The statute does not define “honest services”
fraud, a task that was left principally to prosecutors and secondarily
to courts.
As many others have recounted, the honest services statute produced a morass of case law with contradictory interpretations of the
statute.44 The Court in Skilling described this confusion, stating,
“courts have disagreed about whether § 1346 prosecutions must be
based on a violation of state law, whether a defendant must contemplate that the victim suffer economic harm, and whether the defendant must act in pursuit of private gain.”45 The courts had also been
conflicted over whether pre-§ 1346 law was relevant when interpreting the honest services statute.46

42. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181,
4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)); see United States v. Brumley,
116 F.3d 728, 746–47 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly, J., dissenting).
43. Brumley, 116 F.3d at 743 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
44. Justice Scalia, in his Skilling concurrence, described with characteristic flair
the uncertain boundaries of honest services fraud:
The possibilities range from any action that is contrary to public policy or
otherwise immoral, to only the disloyalty of a public official or employee to
his principal, to only the secret use of a perpetrator’s position of trust in order to harm whomever he is beholden to. The duty probably did not have to
be rooted in state law, but maybe it did. It might have been more demanding in the case of public officials, but perhaps not. At the time § 1346 was
enacted there was no settled criterion for choosing among these options, for
conclusively settling what was in and what was out.
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2938 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia had earlier provided a more detailed critique of the statute. See Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1309–10 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
45. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 n.36. As one court noted:
The relationship between state law and the federal honest services statute is
unsettled. The Fifth Circuit has held that section 1346 extends only to conduct that independently violates state law. Other circuits have denied that
state law plays any necessary role. It is plain that sections 1341 and 1346
enact a federal crime—but beyond that, broad generalizations may be unsafe.
United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 298 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
46. Compare United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc), with Rybicki,
354 F.3d at 143. The Court in Skilling expressly relied upon pre-McNally cases. See
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933–34. See generally STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note
24, at 86–87.
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D. The Skilling Decision
Twenty-two years after Congress enacted § 1346, the Court in Skilling finally confronted the meaning and constitutionality of the honest
services statute.47 The Skilling case arose from the facts leading to
2001 bankruptcy of Enron. The government charged Jeffrey Skilling,
Enron’s former CEO, and others with a massive fraud case in connection with Enron’s demise.48 At his trial, the jury convicted Skilling of
conspiracy, mail fraud under the honest services theory, and securities
fraud.49 The Court granted certiorari on two honest-services related
issues: whether an honest services fraud scheme must include an intended private gain from the scheme’s victim and whether the honest
services statute is unconstitutionally vague.50
Many commentators had hoped that the Court would use the Skilling case as an opportunity either to invalidate the honest services
statute in its entirety or to provide a comprehensive and coherent
construct of the statute.51 The Court did neither. Reversing Skilling’s
honest services conviction, the Court declined to invalidate the statute as unconstitutionally vague.52 Instead, the Court purported to
survey honest services case law in order to divine the meaning of the
term “honest services.”53 The Court found that the “‘vast majority’ of
the honest-services cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes . . . . Congress’s reversal of McNally and reinstatement of the honest-services
doctrine, we conclude, can and should be salvaged by confining its
scope to the core pre-McNally applications . . . .”54 The Court continued:
there is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to reach at least
bribes and kickbacks.

Reading the statute to proscribe a wider

47. In 2009, the Court granted certiorari in Skilling and two other honest services
cases. In the first honest service case, the issue was whether an honest services violation must be based upon an underlying state law violation. United States v.
Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (2008). In the second honest service case, the issue
was whether the honest services fraud scheme must be designed to cause harm to the
intended victim of the scheme. Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2965 (2010).
The Court vacated and remanded both of those cases for reconsideration in light of
Skilling. Black, 130 S. Ct. at 2970; Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1248.
48. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2900.
49. Id. at 2901.
50. Id. at 2912.
51. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 4, at 43.
52. Skilling , 130 S. Ct. at 2933.
53. Id. at 2928–31.
54. Id. at 2930–31.
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range of offensive conduct, we acknowledge, would raise the due
process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine . . . . [W]e now
hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the
pre-McNally case law.55

In a footnote, the Court practically dared Congress to attempt to enact a broader honest services statute that would withstand a vagueness challenge.56
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, three concurring justices
concluded that § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague and should have
been held invalid in its entirety in Skilling’s case.57 The concurring
justices also criticized the Court for overstepping its bounds by essentially creating a new federal crime that appears nowhere in the statute.58
II. THE REACTION TO SKILLING
Although there were many disparate reactions to the Skilling decision, one common response was surprise.59 The Court’s decision was
rooted neither in precedent nor in the statute’s legislative history or

55. Id. at 2931.
56. Responding to arguments made in the government’s brief, the Court wrote:
If Congress were to take up the enterprise of criminalizing “undisclosed
self-dealing by a public official or private employee,” it would have to employ standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due
process concerns. The government proposes a standard that prohibits the
“taking of official action by the employee that furthers his own undisclosed
financial interests while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom
he owes a fiduciary duty,” so long as the employee acts with a specific intent
to deceive and the undisclosed conduct could influence the victim to change
its behavior. That formulation, however, leaves many questions unanswered. How direct or significant does the conflicting financial interest have
to be? To what extent does the official action have to further that interest
in order to amount to fraud? To whom should the disclosure be made and
what information should it convey? These questions and others call for particular care in attempting to formulate an adequate criminal prohibition in
this context.
Id. at 2933 n.44 (citations omitted).
57. Justice Scalia argued that the statute should have been held invalid on an asapplied basis, but that the decision would limit future prosecutions under the statute
because of stare decisis. Id. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]n transforming the prohibition of ‘honest-services fraud’ into a prohibition of ‘bribery and kick-backs’ [the majority] is
wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal crimes.”) (alteration to the original in the quoted text).
59. Buell, supra note 4, at 43.
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language.60 In this light, the decision was vulnerable to attack from
all sides, ranging from those who believe that honest services fraud
provides prosecutors with an important route for attacking public and
private malfeasance to those who believe that “honest services” is a
fatally vague crime subject to prosecutorial abuse.61 Others, including
the concurring justices, believe that the new version of the crime
leaves many questions unanswered and is nearly as vague as the old
one.62 Finally, some fault the Court for not using the opportunity to
provide a comprehensive theory of the law of fraud.63 This Section
analyzes and responds to the principal criticisms of the Skilling decision.64
A. A Broad Honest Services Fraud Statute is Not a Necessary or
Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Public and Private
Malfeasance
Many have argued that a broad honest services statute provides a
necessary anti-corruption tool by supplementing existing laws.65 The

60. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Among all the preMcNally smorgasbord-offerings of varieties of honest-services fraud, not one is limited to bribery and kickbacks. That is a dish the Court has cooked up all on its
own”); see also id. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Until today, no one has thought
(and there is no basis for thinking) that the honest-services statute prohibited only
bribery and kickbacks.”).
61. See Buell, supra note 4, at 32.
62. The concurrence argued that limiting “honest services” fraud to bribes and
kickbacks:
would not suffice to eliminate the vagueness of the statute. It would solve
(perhaps) the indeterminacy of what acts constitute a breach of the “honest
services” obligation under the pre-McNally law. But it would not solve the
most fundamental indeterminacy: the character of the “fiduciary capacity”
to which the bribery and kickback restriction applies. Does it apply only to
public officials? Or in addition to private individuals who contract with the
public? Or to everyone, including the corporate officer here? The preMcNally case law does not provide an answer. Thus, even with the bribery
and kickback limitation the statute does not answer the question “What is
the criterion of guilt?”
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2938–39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
63. See Buell, supra note 4, at 43.
64. See infra Part II.A–D.
65. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
251, 259 (2010) [hereinafter Beale, Honest Services] (Congress “enacted § 1346 in
order to cast a wider prosecutorial net.”); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Criminalizing the Denial of Honest Services After Skilling, 11 WIS. L. REV. 27, 52 (2011) (advocating a
Congressional response to Skilling); Jennifer I. Rowe, Comment, The Future of
Honest Services Fraud, 74 ALB. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2010–2011) (positing that fed-
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usual reasons are lack of resources and potential political interference
at the state and local level.66 In the story discussed at the beginning of
this Article, a local official may have been guilty of violating state ethics rules.67 In one of the cases in which the Supreme Court granted
certiorari along with Skilling,68 a state legislator apparently violated
state ethics rules by failing to disclose a more direct conflict of interest.69 Such cases, some argue, are important crimes that should be
prosecuted at the federal level.
The response is that rendering such acts federal crimes subject to
substantial prison time throws our federal system out of whack in a
myriad of ways.70 On the federal side, do we want our limited resources to be used to prosecute individual violations of state and local
ethics rules? The risk of politically retributive charges is simply too
great,71 and the use of resources suspect. On the state and local side,
would federal intrusion remove the incentive to self-police such violations?72
Yes, on occasion, local law enforcement agencies may be too entwined with local politics to be able to do the job effectively. And in
cases of large-scale corruption, the balance might tip towards federal
involvement. In such cases, however, it is almost inconceivable that
the corrupt officials have not violated federal law more directly applieral intervention is necessary in both public and private sector state and local fraud
cases).
66. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 65, at 438.
67. See supra note 1.
68. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (2008), vacated, 130 S.
Ct. 2971 (2010).
69. Id. at 1239–40.
70. See Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 260 (“[I]t’s the federal government setting the standards for good government on the part of state and local officials. That’s a terrible idea.”).
71. For a highly-publicized case, consider the prosecution of former Alabama
governor Don Siegelman, who was charged with various crimes, including honest services fraud. For the latest decision in this ongoing saga, see United States v.
Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011). For additional background to this controversial case, which many consider to have been politically motivated, see John
Schwartz, Judges Take Another Look at Ex-Alabama Governor’s Conviction, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A16.
72. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 712 (1999) (arguing that the overfederalization of
criminal law has had the effect of consolidating power in the federal government at
the expense of the states); Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 265 (arguing that
the threat of the rare federal prosecution may reduce incentives for state and local
governments to clean up their own houses); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief:
The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1172–74
(1995) (arguing that overfederalization damages state and local law enforcement).
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cable to their actions. State bribery laws, for example, are RICO
predicates.73 The federal extortion statute applies to state and local
officials who use the power of their office to extract bribes.74 If the
feds need to get involved because of enforcement barriers at the local
level, then they will almost surely have a way to do so without resorting to a vague, concocted crime such as honest services fraud. With
respect to corrupt federal officials, the wide reach of extortion, bribery, and gratuities statutes covers the gamut of serious wrongdoing.75
All in all, in a substantial majority of cases, any serious corruption
scheme will fall within of the ambit of one or more federal criminal
statutes. For federal public officials, these are, explicitly, anticorruption statutes. Some argue the high-profile state and local corruption cases, such as that against former Illinois governor Rod
Blagojevich, demonstrate the need for the honest services statute.76
Yet, in the vast majority of these cases, an honest services charge is
unnecessary.
The Blagojevich case provides a telling example. The government
charged that he committed a number of crimes, including federal program bribery, false statements, and extortion, arising out of his attempt to sell President Obama’s senate seat.77 The indictment also
included a RICO charge, with federal law extortion and state law
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006).
74. Id. § 1951. The leading Supreme Court cases interpreting this statute in the
public corruption context are McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), and
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). For criticism of the broad reading of the
statute utilized in the Evans decision, see Thomas A. Secrest, Criminal Law: Bribery

Equals Extortion: The Supreme Court Refuses to Make Inducement a Necessary Element of Extortion “Under Color of Official Right” Under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b): Evans v. United States, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 251, 277 (1993) (“The
courts’ expansion of the Hobbs Act, as evidenced in Evans, results in granting federal
prosecutors ‘virtually unlimited discretion to define both the meaning of the Hobbs
Act as well as whom it should reach.’”).
75. Although the Supreme Court limited the reach of the gratuities statute in
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 409–12 (1999), it has continually expanded the reach of the federal bribery statutes to cover, for example, remote
connections to the federal government. See, e.g., Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S.
482 (1984). The Supreme Court has exhibited a similar tendency by expanding the
federal extortion statute to reach receipt of bribes by state and local officials. See,
e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). This expanded federal reach has its
own critics. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 72, at 712; Brickey, supra note 72, at 1172–74;
Secrest, supra note 74, at 277. But these statutes, at least, have the virtue of criminalizing a defined scope of activities.
76. See, e.g., Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 265.
77. Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Blagojevich, No. 08 CR888
(N.D. Ill.), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0204_02a.
pdf.
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bribery as the principal predicates. Blagojevich was convicted of
those crimes, in addition to honest services fraud.78 The honest services fraud charge was therefore simply unnecessary to punish Blagojevich for his actions.
It is true that these other statutes have their own overbreadth problems. The RICO statute, for example, itself is notoriously laden with
unclear terms, such as “pattern” and “enterprise.”79 But RICO prosecutions are limited by Department of Justice policies,80 and the statute usually is employed to attack wide scale criminal wrongdoing, not
individual ethics breaches by state and local officials.
In private sector cases, the Skilling case itself shows the redundancy of the honest services statute. Skilling’s crime was, fundamentally,
securities fraud–conspiring to mislead investors into believing that
Enron was financially sound when in fact the company’s fortunes
were spiraling downward.81 The federal government has a valid interest in large scale fraud, either because of the far-reaching impact of
such fraud schemes (like Enron), or because a state or local prosecutor might lack the resources to take on such a case (Enron), or both.82
Such large-scale fraud will nearly always (and maybe even always) entail other crimes, such as securities fraud, bank fraud, and many other
crimes.83 Providing prosecutors with the ability to pile on charges,
perhaps in an effort to coerce a plea, should not be a justification for
a duplicative federal anti-fraud statute.84 And more mundane fraud
cases—a store buyer taking a kickback from a supplier, for example85—really do not merit federal action; indeed, such cases divert resources from the cases that more urgently require the federal government’s attention.
78. See Bob Secter & Jeff Coen, Blagojevich on Guilty Verdict: ‘I, Frankly, Am
Stunned,’ CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-27/
news/chi-blagojevich-jurors-going-into-their-10th-day-20110627_1_politicalcorruption-crime-spree-abraham-lincoln-roll-new-jury.
79. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 321–26, 335–41.
80. Id. at 316–17.
81. Skilling was convicted of one count of conspiracy, one count of insider trading, five counts of making false statements to auditors, and twelve counts of securities
fraud. United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2011). Weyhrauch was
indicted for honest services fraud. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1243
(9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). Black was convicted of mail and wire
fraud in violation of § 1341 and of obstruction of justice in violation of § 1512(c).
Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2967–68 (2010).
82. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 5–7.
83. See, e.g., STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 89–93.
84. See Dervan, supra note 11, at 645.
85. See United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 510–11 (1973).
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In public sector cases, it is true that the need for a broad anticorruption statute may be greater in some ways because of overt and
subtle conflicts of interest that state and local law enforcement agencies may face when confronted with corruption by state and local officials with whom the agencies may have close contacts. But, once
again, the federal government must face decisions concerning resource allocations. If federal law enforcement addressed all actual
and potential conflicts of interest, such as the one discussed at the beginning of this Article, then federal prosecutors would have no time
for anything else.
In addition, an honest services statute focused on bribes and kickbacks could have the effect of directing prosecutors’ energy at the
most egregious cases, leaving less important cases to state and local
law enforcement and to regulatory agencies. For example, as one
commentator has argued in the particular context of health care
fraud, “while Skilling is widely considered to have narrowed the scope
of honest services fraud overall, it may turn out to have the paradoxical effect of inviting additional prosecutions of physicians and others
in the health care industry.”86 Because kickbacks are such a widespread practice in the health care industry, an honest services fraud
statute focused on this practice could energize prosecutors to use
honest services fraud in such cases.87
Similar benefits could occur in public sector corruption cases. Limiting honest services fraud to bribes and kickbacks directs the statute
to the kind of wrongdoing that most directly affects the public’s interests. More subtle forms of political self-dealing, including undisclosed
conflicts of interest, simply appear in too many shades of gray to fall
comfortably within a single federal criminal fraud statute.
At a minimum, Congress should recognize that not every instance
of public malfeasance is appropriately addressed by the criminal law.
Yes, politicians are eager to appear to be tough on crime, particularly
where they can appear to be acting to punish their own. But this motivation runs the risk of sliding into sanctimonious and ill-considered
legislation. Not every shady political dealing should be a crime, for if
it were prosecutors would have no time to pursue other matters. And
not every politician’s crime should be dealt with at the federal level.

86. Joan H. Krause, Skilling and The Pursuit of Health Care Fraud, 66 U. Miami
L. Rev. 363, 364–65 (2012).
87. Id.
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B. The Court’s Decision to Narrow Rather Than Void the
Honest Services Statute Was a Reasonable Response to
Overcriminalization
Both the Skilling concurring justices and a number of commentators have opined that the Court overstepped its bounds in narrowing
the honest services statute rather than holding the statute void in its
entirety. Justice Scalia stated that, “in transforming the prohibition of
‘honest-services fraud’ into a prohibition of ‘bribery and kick-backs’
[the Court] is wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal crimes.”88 Others flatly stated that the Court
“stepped over the separation of powers line.”89
Although there is a certain purity to this criticism, it ignores reality.
Courts are frequently confronted with unclear statutes, and a key part
of a court’s job is to interpret such statutes. In particular, the United
States Supreme Court has done this over and over again.90 Given this
reality, a strict separation of powers doctrine that severely limits judicial statutory interpretation is largely theoretical. As Professor John
Jeffries has written, under the traditional view,
the legislature . . . was the only legitimate institution for enforcing
societal judgments through the penal law. Judicial innovation was
politically illegitimate . . . . Although doubtless less central than in
the past, [separation of powers] remains an established feature of
American political ideology. As a guide for judicial action in the
field of criminal law, however, separation of powers is not very helpful.91

Why does Jeffries reach this conclusion? Because of the problem
of vague statutes. Simply put, “interstitial judicial lawmaking is at
least tolerated and perhaps affirmatively authorized. More to the
point, it is inevitable. Any resolution of statutory ambiguity involves
judicial choice. The resulting ‘gloss’ on the legislative text is both politically legitimate and institutionally unavoidable.”92
88. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(alteration in original).
89. Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 254 (describing uncertainties postSkilling).
90. See J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41,
63 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court frequently interprets federal criminal statutes and
has created a large body of case law from which to draw basic principles of statutory
interpretation.”).
91. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 202 (1985).
92. Id. at 204.
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In this context, the Skilling concurrence was simply unrealistic in its
insistence on judicial purity in construing ambiguous statutes.93 The
Skilling reading of the honest services statute no more constituted
legislation than did the Court’s reading, for example, of RICO’s “pattern” requirement to mean “continuity plus relationship,”94 an interpretation with which Justice Scalia concurred, albeit reluctantly.95
There are many similar examples, and so the Skilling critics really are
crying wolf when complaining that the Court has overstepped its
bounds.
C.

The Skilling Decision Substantially Reduced the Risks
Inherent in a Vague Criminal Statute

One of the most frequent criticisms of Skilling is that it raises as
many questions as it answers.96 Most significantly perhaps, courts are
already expressing uncertainty concerning whether honest services
fraud based on an omission must include proof that the defendant
owed a fiduciary duty.97 This is one of the most potent criticisms that
has been leveled at the decision, and it has some validity.
The Court in Skilling apparently concluded that issues of interpretation would rarely arise under its limited definition of honest services.98 The Court was mistaken.99 Many interpretation issues remain, including: the definitions of “bribe” and “kickback;” the source
(state or federal law or statutes) of those definitions;100 whether the

93. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939.
94. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
95. Id. at 251–56 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 254; see also Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at
2938–39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. United States v. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d 405, 408–10 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that such a duty is not required).
98. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 n.41 (issues of ambiguity are “rare in bribe and
kickback cases. The existence of a fiduciary relationship, under any definition of that
term, usually [has been] beyond dispute; examples include public official-public, employee-employer, and union official-union members.”) (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 409; Brief for the United States at 27, United States v. Scanlon, No. 11-3024, 2011 WL 3440447 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 2012) (“[A]t
no point did Skilling hold that these three fiduciary relationships marked the outer
boundaries of § 1346”). See generally STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at
87–88.
100. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissenting); see United States v. Carbo, 572 F.3d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
most obvious form of honest services fraud is outright bribery of a public official);
Memorandum of Robert Geddie In Support of Motion to Dismiss Count Three (3)
and Counts Twenty-Three (23) Through Thirty-Three (33) Or In the Alternative, For
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bribe or kickback must violate the law; whether that law must provide
for criminal sanctions in order to qualify; whether honest services
fraud extends beyond public officials and agents of public entities to
reach private persons; whether, if the statute reaches private persons,
the same standards apply as for public officials and agents; in the case
of a private party, whether an intended harm is required and, if so,
whether economic harm is required or some other sort of harm would
suffice;101 whether, in a case of undisclosed self-dealing, the government could instead argue the deprivation of an intangible property
right.102
To understand the uncertainties that courts still must confront
post-Skilling, take the recent decision in United States v.
Milovanovic.103 In that case, the defendants were charged in connection with a bribery scheme involving a state’s issuance of commercial
drivers’ licenses. The state hired a company to provide translating
services in connection with the issuance of those licenses.104 The defendants schemed to take bribes in exchange for assisting particular
license applicants.105 The defendants moved to dismiss the honest
services charge, arguing that they owed no fiduciary duty to the victim
of the scheme, the state.106 The district court agreed and dismissed
the honest services charges.107 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that a breach of a fiduciary duty is not required in an honest
services case.108 In place of this requirement, the court found that an
honest services case must be based upon “a legally enforceable right
to have another provide honest services.”109
a Bill of Particulars at 10, United States v. Geddie, 2:10-CR-00186, 2011 WL 2278910
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 22, 2011) (citing Skilling for the proposition that “§ 1346 criminalizes
only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law . . . involving public
officials in terms of under-the-table cash or gratuities.”) (citation omitted) (alteration
in original).
101. See United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 600–02 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130
S. Ct. 2963 (2010), remanded to 625 F.3d 386, 391–92 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing honest services fraud conviction).
102. See Dane C. Ball, Repacking Skilling-Barred Fraud Theories: A Form of
Damage Control that Goes Too Far, 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA) 22, 741
(2010).
103. 627 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 2010).
104. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 407.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 407–08.
107. Id. at 407.
108. Id. at 413.
109. Id. at 412 (citing United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 155 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Raggi, J., concurring)). The dissent argued that, “[w]ithout some kind of limiting
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In this light, the Skilling decision has not resolved the many open
questions regarding the scope of honest services fraud.110 Still, limiting the statute to bribes and kickbacks surely does make it far more
likely that a potential defendant is on notice of the consequences of
such unethical actions.111 Also, as the Court has noted, the fair notice
aspect of the vagueness doctrine ultimately is not the most important
aspect of the doctrine.112 Although many, if not most, commentators
tend to focus on the notice provision of the doctrine,113 fair notice

principle, honest services wire fraud could potentially make relatively innocuous
conduct subject to criminal sanctions.” Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 414 (Fernandez, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir.
2009)).
110. In Skilling, the Court referred to United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2003), as a “leading” honest services case. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
2896, 2929 (2010). The Second Circuit in Rybicki rejected a vagueness challenge to §
1346. The Rybicki dissent, however, responded by noting the myriad ways in which
the statute remains unclear. See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 162–63 (2d
Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of Rybicki, see
STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 87.
111. See Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 259 (citing the Weyhrauch case
and noting that, since the defendant’s actions violated ethical rules but not state law,
it would be difficult for a defendant to be on notice that his actions constituted a federal felony).
112. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (“[A]lthough the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have
recognized recently that the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’”) (citation omitted). Many consider the fair warning prong actually to be something of a myth. See
Jeffries, supra note 91, at 210 (“[T]he continuing strength of ‘ignorance of the law is
no excuse’ is telling evidence of the abstracted and artificial character of the rhetoric
of ‘fair warning.’”). The Court has stated, in any event, that “[v]agueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of [the] two independent reasons.” Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
113. This Article does not undertake an exploration of the complicated, and unsettled, law of facial versus as-applied statutory challenges. As others have noted, the
Court applies the distinction in inconsistent, result-driven ways. See, e.g., Beale,
Honest Services, supra note 65, at 257 (the Court “hasn’t articulated a clear standard
for when it will permit facial challenges and its decisions have been inconsistent”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
915, 964 (2011) (“With the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges being
less fundamental than courts and commentators have often assumed, it should occasion no surprise that the Supreme Court does not always labor self-consciously to
draw that distinction . . . .”); David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the
Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689,
690 (2008) (“[S]everal of the Roberts Court’s decisions adopt the language of the asapplied model even as their reasoning pursues the logic of the facial model.”); Alex
Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 657, 665 (2010) (“[N]o single consideration governed the use of facial chal-
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does not require actual notice or understanding, just the potential for
notice. And in construing statutes for this purpose, courts generally
take judicial interpretations of statutes into account.114 Under these
standards, in a substantial majority of honest services cases, the defendants almost certainly knew that their actions were unethical and
potentially unlawful.
Far more significant, though, is the potential that a vague statute
will lead prosecutors to stretch laws in ways in which they have never
before been used,115 often for improper reasons such as career enhancement or political bias.116 As Professor Jeffries has written, the
“rule of law” is the grounding principle of the vagueness doctrine.
The rule of law in the enforcement of criminal laws seeks to limit “caprice and whim, the misuse of government power for private ends,
and the unacknowledged reliance on illegitimate criteria of selection.
The goals to be advanced are regularity and evenhandedness in the
administration of justice and accountability in the use of government
power.”117
It is difficult to deny that the honest services statute, pre-Skilling,
was subject to the “caprice and whim” of federal prosecutors. Although uncertainties exist concerning post-Skilling honest services
fraud, they are certainly fewer, and less complex, than those under
the previous incarnation of honest services fraud.
There is one significant caveat to this conclusion, however. Federal
prosecutors, in search of ways to resurrect honest services charges
post-Skilling, may be tempted to try to stretch the mail and wire fraud

lenges, which . . . involves a mixture of substantive constitutional law, institutional
competence and statutory interpretation.”).
114. See, e.g., Beale, Honest Services, supra note 65, at 258 (“[H]ow can a statute
be unconstitutionally vague on its face when the text plus the relevant case law provide adequate notice to many defendants of the prohibited conduct and accompanying penalties?”).
115. See Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 3, at 49–52.
116. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States
Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 386 (2009) [hereinafter Beale, Rethinking]
(“The criticism of the Siegelman prosecution generally focuses on . . . a claim that
Siegelman was targeted by the Bush White House and U.S. Attorney’s Office because he was a successful Democratic politician . . . .”).
117. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 212–13; see also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 352 (a statute
is unconstitutionally vague when it “vests virtually complete discretion in the hands
of police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute”). For an analysis
of the breadth of the honest services statute, see Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a
Meat Axe: Using Honest Services Fraud to Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 929, 933, 956–57 (2009).
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statutes in other ways.118 It is the nature of prosecutorial power that
those who make charging decisions will attempt to take criminal statutes to their limits.119 Thus, if a federal prosecutor has determined
that a particular individual merits prosecution, then the prosecutor is
likely to try to find a law to fit the person. In the absence of an honest services theory or other applicable statute, however, what is a
prosecutor to do?
Unfortunately for those looking for predictability in the enforcement of criminal law, the Supreme Court has left the door open for
another theory. In perhaps its most important post-McNally, preSkilling mail/wire fraud case, Carpenter v. United States, the Court
adopted an expansive version of property rights that creative prosecutors may be able to use to fill the void left by Skilling.120 Although the
Court held in McNally that a mail or wire case may not be based upon
the “intangible” right to honest services, the Court held in Carpenter
that such a case may be based upon “intangible” property rights. In
that case, the right at issue was a newspaper’s right to the confidentiality and exclusive use of information gathered by its reporters.121
The problem with the Carpenter decision is that, even more than
with Skilling, the Court left the boundaries of its rule unclear. The
Court never defined the nature or source of the duties that employees
owe employers that might give right to “intangible” property rights.122
As Professor John Coffee has noted, the decision potentially criminalized all breaches of fiduciary duties owed by employees to employ-

118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2008).
119. See Beale, Rethinking, supra note 116, at 438 (“In the case of the more amorphous argument that a state or local official deprived the citizens of his or her honest
services, however, the prosecutor is not merely assessing the strength of the evidence,
but in many cases is also seeking to expand the definition of the conduct that constitutes a crime.”); Eliason, supra note 117, at 972–73; Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 3, at 52.
120. 484 U.S. 19, 26–28 (1987).
121. In Carpenter, a Wall Street Journal reporter wrote a regular financial column
that often affected stock prices. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 19–20
(1987). The reporter and his co-conspirators traded on stocks discussed in the column before the column was published, reaping substantial profits and violating the
terms of the reporter’s employment agreement. Id.
122. See John C. Coffee Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of
Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (1988) (arguing that the decision is “(a) historically unsound, (b) inconsistent with most statutory law dealing with
the subject of trade secrets, and (c) capable of trivializing the Court=s decision only
months earlier in McNally v. United States, which clearly sought to cut back on the
amoeba-like growth of the mail and wire fraud statutes”).
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ers.123 In addition, Carpenter allowed federal prosecutors to bring
cases that would ordinarily be left to state civil and criminal law.124
We can already see the ricochet effect that Skilling will have on
cases where prosecutors seek to overcome Skilling’s holding by creatively defining deprivations of “intangible” property rights. This development will simply require the courts to be vigilant in restricting
prosecutors’ attempts to expand the definition of property under the
mail and wire fraud statutes.125
D. The Court in Skilling Properly Declined to Engage in a More
Detailed Rewriting of the Honest Services Statute
One criticism of Skilling is that it did not address the underlying
theoretical and conceptual challenges of the federal law of honest
services fraud.126 There are many such challenges, but several stand
out: In the case of an omission to disclose a bribe or kickback, must
the defendant owe a fiduciary duty to the victim? If so, to what body
of law do we look to ascertain the presence of such a duty?127 In the
case of a private sector defendant, must the victim be deprived on
some sort of tangible harm? If so, what sorts of harm qualify?128
But to respond to these questions in a meaningful way, the Court
would have had to undertake a far more drastic rewriting of the honest services statute than it did. . This process would necessarily have
involved describing the reaches of duties giving rise to fraud charges,
among other issues. Further, the Court would have been required to
define the terms “bribe” and “kickback” in the context of a case that
involved neither.129 Does the definition of bribery under the federal
123. Id.
124. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 79–80. The Court did later
attempt to limit the definition of “property” to traditional property rights, holding in
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000), that unissued permits or licenses
are not “property” under § 1341. See id. at 81. The pending legislation, reproduced in
the Appendix, would reverse this decision. See infra pp. 339–41.
125. See Beale, Rethinking, supra note 116, at 438.
126. Buell, supra note 4, at 43.
127. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2938–39 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. See Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); James Lockhart, Validity,

Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346, Providing that, for Purposes of
Some Federal Criminal Statutes, Term “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud” Includes
Scheme or Artifice to Deprive Another of Intangible Right to Honest Services, 172
A.L.R. FED. 109 (2001).
129. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring); Buell, supra note 4, at
45 (“Supreme Court opinions, of course, almost always open up new issues and fail to
resolve old ones. The more serious deficit in the Skilling opinion is the missed oppor-
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bribery law apply, thus requiring a quid pro quo? Some even argue
that the Court should have used the opportunity to provide us with a
black letter exegesis on the very nature of fraud itself.130 But for the
Court to have undertaken this task would have been unprecedented
and probably beyond the Court’s capacity.
It is true that the Court has expounded upon certain forms of
fraud, such as securities fraud, in attempts to clarify particular theories of such fraud.131 Using insider trading as an example, courts have
long held that corporate insiders who possess material non-public information must either disclose that information or abstain from trading.132 The theoretical basis for such fraud is the insider’s breach of
duty, when engaging in such self-dealing, to the corporation and its
shareholders.133 But what if the information is stolen not by a corporate insider, but instead by a lawyer who is working on a client’s acquisition of a target company and who trades in the target company’s
stock? That lawyer is not a corporate insider of the target company,
and so the traditional rule of insider trading does not apply.134
Resolving a circuit split and much uncertainty over this issue, the
Court held in United States v. O’Hagan that the lawyer’s breach of
fiduciary duty to the firm and the firm’s client— parties that expected
the information to be kept confidential—is actionable as securities
fraud under the “misappropriation” theory.135 Although subject to
substantial criticism because of its own definitional problems,136 this
theory has developed in the context of a substantial body of case law
that does, arguably, fairly define its boundaries. The federal law of
fraud in general, and the post-Skilling law of honest services fraud in
particular, can similarly be left to the sort of natural evolution that securities fraud has undergone.

tunity to grapple seriously with the relationship and context problem in the law of
fraud.”).
130. See Buell, supra note 4, at 45.
131. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 643.
134. Id. at 653 n.5.
135. Id. at 647.
136. See David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 80 (1998) (“By injecting unclear notions of unfairness into the federal securities laws, the misappropriation theory fails to provide a clear or rational standard.”); Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and
Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1091, 1120–21 (1997) (noting that the
boundaries of the theory are unclear).
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And there is an additional cautionary tale here. The Court in

O’Hagan would have been well within its bounds to reject the misappropriation theory, as the dissent argued so vehemently that it should
have done.137 This would have left the hard work of defining this
prosecutorially-created and judicially-sanctioned crime—the misappropriation theory appears nowhere in the securities fraud statutes—
to Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission.138 But assuming the Court appropriately endorsed the misappropriation theory, it also made sense for the Court not to attempt to define the outer
boundaries of that theory, but to leave the task to lower courts when
applying particular sets of facts. Likewise, it was reasonable for the
Court to remand the Skilling companion cases—Weyhrauch and
Black —without deciding the important issues that those cases raised.
If the cases turned out, on remand, not to be viable because Skilling’s
holding, then the Court would have been overstepping its bounds to
reach those issues.139
III. THE COURT’S OPTIONS IN SKILLING
As discussed above, the Skilling decision leaves many questions
unanswered, but the decision does make the reach of honest services
fraud more certain.140 In broader terms, what lessons can we glean
from Skilling’s approach to the task of interpreting complex criminal
laws? Given the inevitability of the judicial construction of penal
statutes, are there governing principles that courts usually employ, or
should employ, when construing ambiguous statutes? Many commentators have attempted to provide guidelines,141 but for present

137. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 680.
138. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 108–09.
139. United States v. Black, 625 F.3d 386, 394 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Weyhrauch, 623 F. 3d 707, 708 (9th Cir. 2010).
140. As Professor Jeffries has written, “a judge confronting ambiguity in a penal
statute might usefully ask whether a proposed resolution makes the law more or less
certain.” Jeffries, supra note 91, at 220.
141. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2032 (2002) (positing a “Preference-Estimating” theory, which
argues that courts should interpret statutes to match what Congress would enact in
the current legislative environment); William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 415 (1991) (positing a
“Dynamic Statutory Interpretation” theory, which argues that courts should interpret
statutes in conformity with social changes); John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2388, 2486 (2003) (arguing in favor of textualism, which requires
that judges enforce the plain meaning of the statute, even if it leads to absurd results);
see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
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purposes the focus is on the practical realities that the Court faced in
Skilling.
Given the attacks the Court took from all sides, what were the
Court’s options in the case? There appear to have been four obvious
courses of action: (1) do nothing, and leave the uncertainty over honest services fraud in place;142 (2) invalidate the entire statute, leading
almost inevitably to a Congressional response that would, given Congress’s track record, make matters worse;143 (3) undertake a complete
reworking of mail fraud and honest services fraud, a task the Court is
ill-equipped to undertake and has rarely, if ever, successfully undertaken in analogous circumstances; or (4) attempt to provide some
clarity to the statute by narrowing its focus, which is what the bribery
and kickback limitation arguably does. It is not irrational to conclude
that the fourth option was the best, or least bad, alternative. Despite
what some have claimed, the honest services statute pre-Skilling was
truly ambiguous.144 Indeed, many would argue that the Court’s job is
to clarify such ambiguity.145 A pragmatic approach to the problem is,
in this context, largely defensible.
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the Skilling majority opinion, appears
to be, at heart, a pragmatist when confronted with complex federal
criminal law issues. Her majority opinion in O’Hagan, for example,
upheld the misappropriation theory on practical grounds, finding the
theory necessary to safeguard confidence in the fairness of the securities markets.146 The Court reached this conclusion without defining
the boundaries of the fiduciary duty that a misappropriating party
must owe to a wronged party, leaving it to the SEC and the lower
courts to define these boundaries.147
REV. 505, 565 (2001) (describing the role of courts in filling in the content of criminal
statutes).
142. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting the confusion among circuit courts).
143. See infra pp. 339–41.
144. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
145. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 207 (“Facial uncertainty may be cured by judicial
construction. Indeed, judicial specification will be accepted as sufficient even where
it amounts to a wholesale rewriting of the statutory text.”).
146. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).
147. In 2000, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2, entitled ‘‘Duties of trust or confidence
in misappropriation insider trading cases,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2, in an attempt to
provide some clarity to this theory. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24,
at 112–13. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg also wrote the unanimous decision in
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), which narrowly construed the definition of property under the mail and wire fraud statutes. Although not explicit in her
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Even more telling, perhaps, was Justice Ginsburg’s vote in United
States v. Booker.148 In that case, the five-member majority held that a
sentence enhancement based on the judge’s determination of a fact—
other than a prior conviction, not found by the jury or admitted by
the defendant—violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.149 A separate five-member majority held that the appropriate remedy for this violation is not to require that the jury determine
all the relevant facts.150 Instead, this opinion held, the Sixth Amendment infirmity could be cured by holding that the federal sentencing
guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory.151 Justice Ginsburg,
who did not write an opinion in Booker, provided the swing vote, siding with both the majority merits opinion152 and the remedial decision.153 She was the only member of the merits majority to join in the
remedial opinion.154 The result was very pragmatic; instead of a complex and potentially cumbersome system requiring that juries engage
sentencing-related fact-finding, Booker’s effect is to follow the existing system of judicial fact-finding while allowing trial judges some discretion under the now-advisory guidelines scheme.155 The Court—
perhaps unanimously—may well have also concluded that this practical solution would be preferable to an attempt by Congress to remedy
the situation.
The result in Skilling was similarly pragmatic—to confine prosecutors’ discretion in honest services cases, while also providing far more
notice to potential defendants of the statute’s reach. Presumably, the
Skilling majority also hoped that this approach would assuage Congress from responding with a revised and expanded honest services
statute; the Court’s footnote outlining the challenges in constructing
such a statute supports this conclusion.156 As the next Part shows,
Skilling opinion, overfederalization seems to be a serious concern for Justice Ginsburg, who wrote in Cleveland that the Court would reject a “sweeping expansion of
federal criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement by Congress.” Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000).
148. 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005).
149. Id. at 244.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 245.
152. Id. at 225.
153. Id. at 244.
154. Id. at 225 (Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg in the merits opinion; Justices Breyer, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg in the
remedial opinion).
155. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 24, at 390.
156. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.44 (2010).
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however, the Court may have overestimated Congress’s willingness to
cede power to the Court in defining the scope of federal criminal
law.157
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO SKILLING
In 2010 and 2011, Congress quickly took up the challenge that Skilling posed.158 In fact, in the “Clean Up Government Act of 2011,”
under consideration as this Article goes to press, Congress takes aim
not just at Skilling, but also at a number of judicial decisions that attempted to clarify the scope of federal anti-corruption statutes.159
Among other things, the bill would overturn the Supreme Court’s decision limiting the scope of the federal gratuities statutes,160 the Supreme Court’s decision limiting the definition of “property” under the
mail and wire fraud statutes,161 and the D.C. Circuit’s decision limiting the scope of the federal bribery statute.162 The bill would also
vastly expand federal jurisdiction over state and local bribery cases by
lowering the amount required for federal program bribery from $5000
to $1000163 and by adding this crime as a RICO predicate.164 And just
in case we did not get the message that Congress is really, really tough
on crime, the bill expands venue provisions for certain offenses,165 increases the limitations period for bringing certain charges,166 and expands certain sentences, sometimes dramatically.167 A student of the
judicial-legislative dynamic in the adoption and construction of penal
statutes could well write a treatise based solely on this proposed legislation.
For present purposes, the honest services provision merits close
examination. The proposed honest services amendment, to be codi157. See infra Part IV.
158. Leahy Introduces Bill To Address Supreme Court’s Skilling Decision, Fed.
Info. & News Dispatch, Sept. 28, 2010, available at WLNR 19343461.
159. Clean Up Government Act of 2011, H.R. 2572, 112th Cong. (2011).
160. Id. § 8; see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398,
414 (1999) (requiring connection between the gratuity received and performance of a
specific past, present, or future “official” act).
161. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 2; see also Cleveland v. United States,
531 U.S. 12 (2000) (holding that unissued licenses do not constitute property).
162. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 9; see also Valdes v. United States, 475
F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (limiting the definition of an official act).
163. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 4.
164. Id. § 13.
165. Id. §§ 3, 15.
166. Id. § 11.
167. Id. §§ 4, 5, 11.
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fied as Section 1346A of the federal criminal code, is entitled “Undisclosed self-dealing by public officials.”168 The bill states: “For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ also includes a scheme or artifice by a public official to engage in
undisclosed self-dealing.”169 The bill further defines the term “undisclosed self-dealing”170 in ways that appear to respond to the Court’s
preemptive challenge to such a law in Skilling.171
This proposed legislation truly seems to be a knee-jerk response to
courts’ attempts to (1) provide clarity to criminal statutes, (2) reign in
the rush to overcriminalization, and (3) reign in the rush to
overfederalization. It seems that Congress has reached the point
where any judicial limitation on federal criminal laws is seen as a
power grab by courts that needs a slapping down. A critic of these
trends could see this bill as the culmination of everything wrong with
criminalization in the current environment.
Take a few examples from the bill. The law would penalize “a public official [who] performs an official act for the purpose, in whole or
in material part, of furthering or benefitting a financial interest of . . .
an individual, business, or organization with whom the public official
is negotiating for, or has any arrangement concerning, prospective

168. Id. § 16(a).
169. Id.
170. The bill defines undisclosed self-dealing as follows:
(A) a public official performs an official act for the purpose, in whole or in
material part, of furthering or benefitting a financial interest of—
(i) the public official;
(ii) the spouse or minor child of a public official;
(iii) a general business partner of the public official;
(iv) a business or organization in which the public official is serving as an
employee, officer, director, trustee, or general partner;
(v) an individual, business, or organization with whom the public official is
negotiating for, or has any arrangement concerning, prospective employment or financial compensation; or
(vi) an individual, business, or organization from whom the public official
has received any thing or things of value, otherwise than as provided by law
for the proper discharge of official duty, or by rule or regulation; and
(B) the public official knowingly falsifies, conceals, or covers up material information that is required to be disclosed by any Federal, State, or local
statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the public official, or the
knowing failure of the public official to disclose material information in a
manner that is required by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the public official.

Id.
171. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.45 (2010).
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employment or financial compensation.”172 What does it mean to
have “any arrangement?” The bill does not say. The bill also covers
“an individual, business, or organization from whom the public official has received any thing or things of value.”173 How far does this
reach? Would it, as the Court posited in Sun-Diamond Growers in
connection with the federal gratuities statute, “criminalize a high
school principal’s gift of a school baseball cap to [a public official], by
reason of his office, on the occasion of the latter’s visit to the
school?”174
Most importantly, what would be the practical impact of criminalizing the failure to “disclose material information in a manner that is
required by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or
charter applicable to the public official?”175 On its face, this bill
would provide disparate outcomes depending purely on the location
of the alleged crime; acts that would be criminal in one locality, for
example, would not be criminal in an adjacent locality with different
disclosure laws. And this is not minor criminal liability; the statute
provides for a twenty-year prison sentence.176
To return to the scenario at the beginning of this Article, the local
official appears, on the face of the matter, to have possibly threatened
to hold up a project unless the developer paid the official’s wife for
work she had previously done for an overseas affiliate of the developer on an unrelated matter. Yes, this looks suspicious on its face. But
should it really be a federal crime meriting a sentence of up to twenty
years?177 And if a neighboring state had no such disclosure law,
would it be fair or appropriate to criminalize this act?
The question is whether the scope of the honest services statute,
post-Skilling, so hampers anti-corruption efforts that a replacement
honest services statute is necessary. The real question, in this context,
is whether a broad range of public conflicts of interest needs to be
criminalized and federalized. Where the scheme involves an intended
deprivation of money or property, we are within the realm of traditional fraud,178 though the intangible property rights door opened by
172. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 16(a).
173. Id.
174. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 407 (1999).
175. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 16(a).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008). Of course, the particular
sentence would depend upon the application of the U.S. sentencing guidelines to the
particular case.
177. Clean Up Government Act of 2011 § 6.
178. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356–57 (2008).
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Carpenter invites mischief in defining property rights.179 But it is truly difficult to conceive of an honest services statute that would not
lead to the real danger underlying vague crimes, which invite prosecutors to expand criminal statutes and target individuals unguided by
the terms of the underlying statutes.180
CONCLUSION
The courts have not proved to be an effective bulwark against
over-reaching criminal statutes. After all, it took the Court over
twenty years to limit the scope of the honest services statute;181 it is
difficult to determine the harm—the lives and careers affected, the
millions of dollars in legal fees spent—wrought during that time by a
statute that created an indefinable offense. Congress now faces a
choice: enact a broad honest services statute that similarly invites law
enforcement abuse, or leave in place a narrower construction of the
existing statute that will leave to state and local authorities the pursuit
of those operating at the margins of federal law.182 If attempts to resurrect a broad-reaching form of honest services fraud succeed, then
we can all watch to see if the courts are up to the task of applying
constitutional limitations to that new offense.

179. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (holding that intangible property rights are sufficient). As noted above, even the fairly narrow limitation that the
Court imposed in Cleveland, that unissued licenses are not property interests, would
be removed by the proposed Congressional response to Skilling. See infra pp. 339–41.
180. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 223 (“[T]he result [of vague criminal statutes] is that
lawmaking devolves to law enforcement, and police and prosecutors are invited to
play too large a role in deciding what to punish.”).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
182. Jeffries, supra note 91, at 218 n.81 (“[T]he choice would be between upholding
the statute, in the certain knowledge that it invites abusive enforcement, or striking
the statute at some cost to the effectiveness of legitimate law enforcement.”).
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APPENDIX
United States Library of Congress
HR 2572
Introduced in House
July 15, 2011
To amend title 18, United States Code, to deter public corruption,
and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 15, 2011
Mr. Sensenbrenner (for himself and Mr. Quigley) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To amend title 18, United States Code, to deter public corruption,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘Clean Up Government Act of 2011’.
***
SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON UNDISCLOSED SELF-DEALING
BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
(a) In General. Chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1346 the following new section:
‘Sec. 1346A. Undisclosed self-dealing by public officials
‘(a) Undisclosed Self-Dealing by Public Officials. For purposes of this
chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ also includes a
scheme or artifice by a public official to engage in undisclosed selfdealing.
‘(b) Definitions. As used in this section:
‘(1) Official act. The term ‘official act’—
‘(A) includes any act within the range of official duty, and any decision, recommendation, or action on any question, matter, cause, suit,
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proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or
which may by law be brought before any public official, in such public
official’s official capacity or in such official’s place of trust or profit;
‘(B) may be a single act, more than one act, or a course of conduct;
and
‘(C) includes a decision or recommendation that a government
should not take action.
‘(2) Public official. The term ‘public official’ means an officer, employee, or elected or appointed representative, or person acting for or
on behalf of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State, or
any department, agency or branch of government thereof, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency,
or branch of government.
‘(3) State. The term ‘State’ includes a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession
of the United States.
‘(4) Undisclosed self-dealing. The term ‘undisclosed self-dealing’
means that—
‘(A) a public official performs an official act for the purpose, in
whole or in material part, of furthering or benefitting a financial interest of—
‘(i) the public official;
‘(ii) the spouse or minor child of a public official;
‘(iii) a general business partner of the public official;
‘(iv) a business or organization in which the public official is
serving as an employee, officer, director, trustee, or general partner;
‘(v) an individual, business, or organization with whom the
public official is negotiating for, or has any arrangement concerning,
prospective employment or financial compensation; or
‘(vi) an individual, business, or organization from whom the
public official has received any thing or things of value, otherwise
than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, or by
rule or regulation; and
‘(B) the public official knowingly falsifies, conceals, or covers up
material information that is required to be disclosed by any Federal,
State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the
public official, or the knowing failure of the public official to disclose
material information in a manner that is required by any Federal,
State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the
public official.

STRADER_CHRISTENSEN

2011]

5/10/2012 12:44 PM

SKILLING RECONSIDERED

341

‘(5) Material information. The term ‘material information’ includes
information—
‘(A) regarding a financial interest of a person described in clauses
(i) through (iv) paragraph (4)(A); and
‘(B) regarding the association, connection, or dealings by a public
official with an individual, business, or organization as described in
clauses (iii) through (vi) of paragraph 4.’.
(b) Conforming Amendment. The table of sections for chapter 63 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1346 the following new item:
‘1346A. Undisclosed self-dealing by public officials.’.
(c) Applicability. The amendments made by this section apply to acts
engaged in on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

